Source : INDIA TODAY NEWS
(NOTE: This article was originally published in the India Today issue dated October 19, 2026)
The central premise of aviation security is simple: keep anyone who should not be there away from the people flying the aircraft. September 11, 2001, transformed that premise into an elaborate security architecture—reinforced cockpit doors, tighter access controls, background checks and new crew-security protocols.
But what happens when the threat already has permission to be inside? That question has returned following the events aboard Flydubai flight FZ1073 from Dubai to Tel Aviv on September 30, 2026. Co-pilot Hamam al-Hammami allegedly used the cockpit’s crash axe to attack Indian captain Smit Machchhar, in what UAE prosecutors call a “terrorist attack”. “Had it not been for Capt. Machchhar’s mental and physical strength, who opened the cockpit door while simultaneously thwarting the attacker and bleeding profusely, 174 lives would have perished along with the aircraft,” says military and aviation analyst Arya Ghosh.
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There were 174 passengers and eight crew aboard the Boeing 737 MAX 8. The aircraft can carry about 21 tonnes of jet fuel; had control been seized and the plane deliberately crashed into a densely built urban area, the consequences could have been catastrophic—a risk underscored by the June 2025 crash of Air India flight AI171, a Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner that came down on a hostel building shortly after take-off in Ahmedabad, killing 241 people on board and 19 on the ground.
THE INSIDER PROBLEM
The latest incident exposes a difficult gap in aviation security. “There is nothing in the training modules that can prepare a pilot for his co-pilot going rogue and attacking him,” says Captain Sam Thomas, president of the Airline Pilots’ Association of India. Post-9/11, the reinforced cockpit door became the principal barrier against an attacker trying to gain access. A decade ago, Germanwings Flight 9525 showed what happens when the threat is already inside. On March 24, 2015, its captain left the cockpit while flying over the French Alps. The co-pilot remained inside, locked the door, initiated a descent and prevented the captain from re-entering. All 150 people aboard the Airbus A320 died when it struck the mountainside.
Europe responded with stronger psychological assessment, aeromedical oversight and pilot-support programmes. India’s framework is different. Captain C.S. Randhawa, president of the Federation of Indian Pilots, says, “In many countries, a psychometry test of pilots is mandatory during induction. In India, it is notairlines do it on their own, as part of their processes.” Representatives of Indian carriers contacted for this story, who spoke on condition that their airlines not be named, said “all that can be done”—psychological tests, background checks and other screening during induction—is being done.
THE WARNING GAP
FZ1073 raises another question: what happens when red flags exist but do not travel with the person they concern? The 29-year-old Omani co-pilot had reportedly been removed from flight training at Oman Air and barred from flying in Oman over security concerns relating to his radical ideological views. He subsequently passed vetting in the UAE and had worked for Flydubai for eight months before the incident. That points to two gaps. Pilots can move between airlines and jurisdictions, while intelligence and security information may not move with them. And psychological instruments designed primarily to identify clinical mental health or cognitive disorders may not reliably detect ideological radicalisation.
India’s Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) mandates periodic Class 1 aeromedical certification for commercial pilots. Examiners are expected to pay particular attention to depression, anxiety, panic disorders and substance misuse. Operators are also encouraged to use validated psychological tools during recruitment. But there is no EASA (European Union Aviation Safety Agency)-equivalent universal requirement for a separate operator-level psychological assessment before a pilot begins flying scheduled operations. The DGCA itself recognised the limits of universal testing in the medical circular that came into effect on May 31, 2023. It said comprehensive psychiatric evaluation of every pilot at every periodic medical examination would not be productive or cost-effective because serious psychiatric illness is difficult to predict. Instead, it called for quicker mental health assessment during routine medicals.
Mental health screening has a built-in problem: pilots may fear that reporting symptoms could end their careers. The Germanwings co-pilot had previously suffered a severe depressive episode, returned to flying subject to conditions and later developed significant psychiatric symptoms. The investigation exposed gaps involving treating doctors, aeromedical authorities, confidentiality rules, airline reporting and the pilot’s responsibility to declare himself unfit. A 2024 study by researchers at Sweden’s Karolinska Institutet, based on an anonymous survey of 4,494 commercial pilots across Europe, found that 18 per cent scored above the threshold for possible depression and 23 per cent for possible anxiety disorder. Yet 69 per cent said they would use a pilot peer-support programme if they needed assistance, compared with just 36 per cent who would turn to their employer.
Moreover, unlike substance misuse, mental fitness cannot be established through a single test. Dr Samir Parikh, director of the mental health department at Fortis Hospitals, says, “Assessing mental fitness requires a different system—one based on repeated clinical assessment, validated screening, observation and confidential reporting rather than a single laboratory test.”
BEYOND MENTAL SCREENING
Background vetting provides another layer. Thomas says it is intended to be “quite thorough”. “It takes a few months before an Aerodrome Entry Pass (AEP) is issued to pilots, when all background checks by security agencies are satisfied,” he says. A former director general of the Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS), speaking anonymously, seconds this. “While there is no psychological assessment in the background check,” he says, “it is quite thorough and if there are red flags, say, someone has been radicalised, that should also show up in some shape or form.” The system is not static, though. “Things change pretty quick and security protocols are also updated based on current threats,” the former BCAS chief says.
Former Intelligence Bureau assistant director V.P. Singh argues that security assessment must, therefore, continue through a pilot’s career. “Security checks should not end with recruitment or the initial background verification,” he says. “There should also be periodic re-verification, including scrutiny of any unexplained financial transactions or changes in financial circumstances, wherever legally permissible, as well as relevant financial links that could indicate coercion, inducement or other security concerns.”
That makes the answer less about finding a “rogue pilot test” than building a system of overlapping safeguards. Medical assessments, psychological screening, self-reporting, peer support, substance misuse monitoring, intelligence inputs and periodic re-verification—all have a role. The focus, experts say, should be on ongoing evaluation, not a clearance at recruitment that becomes a security certificate for life.
For India, the stakes are growing. The country has about 10,000 commercial pilots, with another 8,000-10,000 expected to enter the profession over the next five years.
A SYSTEM OF SAFEGUARDS
FZ1073 shows why safeguards must extend beyond screening. Germanwings was a “lockout”; FZ1073 was an attack by one operating pilot on another. Captain Randhawa calls it “a case of total failure of the CRM”. CRM, or crew resource management, is designed around human error, communication, workload and incapacitation. A malicious crew member presents a different threat: they know the aircraft, understand cockpit procedures and already have the access that aviation security is designed to restrict. India’s rules are more explicit when the threat comes from a passenger, with an attempted or actual cockpit breach classified as the highest, Level 4 threat under 2026 DGCA rules. There is less that can be said publicly about the equivalent response to a hostile insider, since predictable security protocols can themselves become vulnerabilities.
The larger requirement is, therefore, coordination. Airlines, regulators, security agencies and law enforcement need mechanisms to ensure that credible security concerns and other serious red flags follow pilots across organisations and, where necessary, borders.
Kapil Kaul, CEO of aviation consultancy CAPA India, puts the broader case: “There has to be a well-structured and proactive consultation framework involving the regulator, airlines and the pilot community,” he says. “You have to look at the entire lifecycle, recruitment, training, briefing, medical and psychological issues. Can you minimise the risk? Yes. Can you eliminate it? Very difficult.” The challenge, then, is to build enough layers of vigilance to ensure that warnings don’t go unheeded and the risk is minimised.
—with Sonali Acharjee
– Ends
SOURCE :- TIMES OF INDIA
